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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 GENEVA 09883

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E.O. 11652: XGDS-1 TAGS: PARM

SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR EARLE'S STATEMENT OF JUNE 29, 1978

(SALT TWO-1798)

1. BEGIN TEXT

MR. MINISTER:

- I

ON JUNE 14 THE UNITED STATES DELEGATION MADE A PROPOSAL WHICH SUPPLEMENTS THE DEFINITION OF CRUISE MISSILE RANGE, AN ISSUE WHICH REMAINS UNRESOLVED IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS. SUBSEQUENTLY, THE SOVIET DELEGATION POSED A NUMBER OF QUESTIONS CONCERNING THIS PROPOSAL. TODAY I WILL ADDRESS THOSE QUESTIONS.

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THE UNITED STATES BELIEVES THAT CRUISE MISSILE RANGE SHOULD BE DEFINED IN TERMS OF OPERATIONALLY EFFECTIVE RANGE. ACCORDINGLY, THE UNITED STATES HAS SET FORTH THE CONCEPT OF MAXIMUM SYSTEM OPERATIONAL RANGE. WE BELIEVE THIS CONCEPT PROVIDES THE BASIS FOR A SATISFACTORY RESOLUTION OF THIS ISSUE.

HOWEVER, IN RESPONSE TO THE CONCERNS EXPRESSED BY THE SOVIET SIDE REGARDING THE PROPOSAL OF THE UNITED STATES, AN ADDITIONAL APPROACH TO SUPPLEMENT THAT CONCEPT WAS PROPOSED ON JUNE 14. AN UNDERSTANDING TO IMPLEMENT THIS APPROACH WOULD PROVIDE THAT A CRUISE MISSILE DEVELOPED AND TESTED FOR ENGAGING TARGETS OTHER THAN SHIPS WILL BE CONSIDERED TO BE CAPABLE OF A RANGE IN EXCESS OF THE RELEVANT RANGE LIMITATION OF THE TREATY OR PROTOCOL EITHER IF IT HAS A MAXIMUM SYSTEM OPERATIONAL RANGE IN EXCESS OF THAT RANGE LIMITATION, OR IF IT CAN COVER A DISTANCE GREATER THAN AN AGREED PERCENTAGE IN EXCESS OF THAT RANGE LIMITATION WHEN OPERATING IN ITS STANDARD FULL-SYSTEM DESIGN MODE. THIS DISTANCE WOULD BE MEASURED ALONG THE PROJECTION OF THE CRUISE MISSILE'S FLIGHT PATH ONTO THE EARTH'S SPHERE FROM ITS POINT OF LAUNCH TO ITS TARGET. AND WOULD NOT INCLUDE THE ADDITIONAL DISTANCE WHICH THE MISSILE THEORETICALLY COULD FLY IF IT USED ITS FUEL RESERVE. IN THE CONTEXT OF THIS APPROACH, STANDARD FULL-SYSTEM DESIGN MODE WOULD REFER TO THE NORMAL FLIGHT PROFILE OF THE CRUISE MISSILE, THAT IS, ITS NORMAL ALTITUDE AND SPEED.

THE SOVIET SIDE HAS INQUIRED ABOUT THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE TWO CRITERIA FOR DEFINING CRUISE MISSILE RANGE. THE UNITED STATES DEFINITION OF CRUISE MISSILE SECRET

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RANGE IS BASED ON MAXIMUM SYSTEM OPERATIONAL RANGE (MSOR). THE JUNE 14 PROPOSAL SUPPLEMENTS THE MSOR CONCEPT. UNDER THAT PROPOSAL, A CRUISE MISSILE WOULD BE CONSIDERED CAPA-BLE OF A RANGE IN EXCESS OF A CERTAIN RANGE LIMIT IF EITHER OF TWO CRITERIA APPLIES. THE FIRST CRITERION WOULD APPLY IF THE MSOR WAS GREATER THAN THE RELEVANT NUMERICAL RANGE LIMITATION. THE SECOND CRITERION WOULD APPLY IF THE MISSILE COULD COVER A DISTANCE GREATER THAN THE SUM OF THE RANGE LIMITATION PLUS AN AGREED PERCENTAGE OF THAT RANGE LIMITATION WHEN OPERATING IN ITS STANDARD FULL-SYS-TEM DESIGN MODE. IF EITHER CRITERION WERE EXCEEDED, THE MISSILE'S RANGE CAPABILITY WOULD BE CONSIDERED TO BE IN EXCESS OF THE RELEVANT RANGE LIMITATION. PUT ANOTHER WAY, FOR A MISSILE TO BE CONSIDERED CAPABLE OF A RANGE LESS THAN THE LIMITATION, THE MSOR MUST BE NO MORE THAN THAT RANGE LIMITATION. AND THE MISSILE MUST BE CAPABLE OF FLY-ING A DISTANCE NO MORE THAN THE LIMITATION PLUS THE AGREED PERCENTAGE IN EXCESS OF THAT RANGE LIMITATION. THERE IS NO DIRECT CORRELATION BETWEEN THESE TWO CRITERIA EXCEPT THAT IF EITHER ONE OR BOTH IS EXCEEDED THE MISSILE WILL BE CONSIDERED TO HAVE A RANGE CAPABILITY IN EXCESS OF THE RELEVANT RANGE LIMITATION.

IV

UNDER BOTH CRITERIA, THE CRUISE MISSILE RANGE WOULD BE DETERMINED WITH THE CRUISE MISSILE OPERATING IN ITS STANDARD FULL-SYSTEM DESIGN MODE. THE STANDARD FULL-SYSTEM DESIGN MODE CONCEPT IS USED IN ORDER THAT CRUISE MISSILE RANGE BE DETERMINED WHEN THE CRUISE MISSILE IS EMPLOYED AS IT WOULD BE UNDER OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS.

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ENCOMPASSES ALL OF THE OPERATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS OF A
CRUISE MISSILE WEAPON SYSTEM AND ITS DESIGNED FLIGHT
PROFILE. THE PURPOSE OF THE CONCEPT IS TO ESTABLISH
THAT THE RANGE CAPABILITY OF THE SYSTEM IS DETERMINED
BY TAKING INTO ACCOUNT FACTORS WHICH AFFECT THE FUNCTIONING OF THE MISSILE IN AN OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT.

- 1

THE SOVIET SIDE HAS SOUGHT FURTHER CLARIFICATION REGARDING THE SIZE OF THE FUEL RESERVE PROVIDED FOR IN THE SUPPLEMENTARY APPROACH, AS WELL AS THE MEANING OF THE PHRASE "TO MEET CONTINGENCIES," AND THE FACTORS CONSIDERED IN DETERMINING FUEL RESERVE. THE PROPOSED APPROACH OF THE UNITED STATES IS THAT IN DEFINING CRUISE MISSILE RANGE EITHER THE MSOR OR THE RANGE LIMITATION PLUS A PERCENTAGE ALLOWANCE WILL BE USED TO DETERMINE WHETHER A CRUISE MISSILE IS CAPABLE OF EFFECTIVELY ENGAGING TARGETS AT A RANGE IN EXCESS OF THE APPLICABLE AGREED RANGE LIMITATION. TO ENSURE THAT THE CRUISE MISSILE IN QUESTION IS CAPABLE

OF EFFECTIVELY ENGAGING TARGETS UP TO THAT RANGE LIMITATION UNDER VARYING CONDITIONS, THE APPROACH INCLUDES A FUEL RESERVE TO ALLOW FOR CONTINGENCIES. THE FUEL RESERVE SECRET

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WOULD BE REASONABLE AND WOULD NOT INCREASE THE EFFECTIVE RANGE OF THE MISSILE.

VI

THE SUPPLEMENTARY APPROACH OF THE UNITED STATES DOES NOT APPLY TO ANTI-SHIP CRUISE MISSILES BECAUSE EFFECTIVELY ENGAGING TARGETS AT SEA IS A DIFFERENT OPERATIONAL PROBLEM FROM THAT OF ENGAGING TARGETS WHICH ARE FIXED. THE REQUIREMENT TO SEARCH FOR, LOCATE, AND ATTACK TARGETS AT SEA IS FUNDAMENTALLY DIFFERENT. THE APPROACH OF THE UNITED STATES REFLECTS THIS DIFFERENCE.

THE SOVIET SIDE HAS QUESTIONED THE CONCEPT OF DIFFER-ENTIATING AMONG CRUISE MISSILES ACCORDING TO THEIR TARGETS. THE APPROACH OF THE UNITED STATES DOES NOT CALL INTO QUESTION THE AGREED LIMITATIONS WHICH APPLY TO CRUISE MISSILES LAUNCHED FROM VARIOUS PLATFORMS. THE SUPPLEMENTARY APPROACH DEALS ONLY WITH DEFINING CRUISE MISSILE RANGE. THE MAXIMUM RANGE AT WHICH A TARGET CAN BE EFFECTIVELY ENGAGED DEPENDS UPON THE MISSION OF THE CRUISE MISSILE WHICH, IN TURN, DEPENDS UPON THE NATURE OF THE TARGET. THUS, THE CRUISE MISSILE RANGE DEFINITION SHOULD TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE MISSION OF THE MISSILE.

VII

ADDITIONALLY, THE SOVIET SIDE HAS EXPRESSED INTEREST IN THE SPECIFIC PERCENTAGE TO BE ADDED TO THE ESTABLISHED RANGE LIMITS, THOSE FACTORS WHICH WOULD DETERMINE THE PERCENTAGE, AND WHETHER THIS PERCENTAGE WOULD BE THE SAME FOR ALL TYPES OF CRUISE MISSILES. ONCE AGREEMENT HAS BEEN REACHED ON THE APPROACH TO BE FOLLOWED IN DETERMINING SECRET

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CRUISE MISSILE RANGE, THE SIDES CAN THEN PROCEED TO NEGOTIATE ON SPECIFIC DETAILS. SUCH DISCUSSIONS WOULD INCLUDE WHETHER THE AGREED PERCENTAGE ALLOWANCE WOULD OR WOULD NOT BE THE SAME FOR ALL CRUISE MISSILES OTHER THAN THOSE TESTED AND DEVELOPED FOR ANTI-SHIP MISSIONS. SIMILARLY, THESE NEGOTIATIONS WOULD INCLUDE DISCUSSIONS

OF WHICH FACTORS WOULD DETERMINE SUCH PERCENTAGE OR PERCENTAGES.

- VIII

MR. MINISTER, THE UNITED STATES CONTINUES TO BELIEVE THAT CRUISE MISSILE RANGE SHOULD BE DEFINED IN TERMS OF OPERATIONALLY EFFECTIVE RANGE. THAT CONCEPT, TOGETHER WITH THE APPROACH PROVIDED ON JUNE 14 AND FURTHER EXPLAINED TODAY, PROVIDES A CONSTRUCTIVE BASIS FOR RESOLVING THE ISSUE OF DEFINING CRUISE MISSILE RANGE. END TEXT. EARLE

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